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GIFFoRD*

FoREWORD

In 1965, Guido Calabresi, then a young Yale Law School Professor, was on sabbatical in Italy writing a draft of what would become his
book, The Costs of Accidents.' While in Europe, he was invited to the
Max-Plank-Institut fftr Ausldndisches und Internationales Privatrecht
in Hamburg to talk about his work with law and economics. Professor
Calabresi delivered the lecture, and at its conclusion, the Direktor of
the Institut, Professor Dr. Konrad Zweigert, said, "Very interesting.
Very interesting indeed." He continued, "But you must understand.
This is not law. And this is not legal scholarship." Whereupon the
young American professor replied, "It may not be now. But it will be
soon."2
On April 23 and 24, 2004, a distinguished group of judges and
professors assembled at the University of Maryland School of Law to
assess whether developments in legal scholarship and in the law have
confirmed Calabresi's prediction. ' How has publication of The Costs
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. GuIDO CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

(1970).
2. The account of the conversation between Professor Guido Calabresi and Professor
Dr. Konrad Zweigert is taken from my telephone conversation with Judge Calabresi on
April 8, 2004.
3. The Symposium, Calabresi'sThe Costs of Accidents: A Generation of Impact on Law
and Scholarship, wasjoindy sponsored by the University of Maryland School of Law and the
Maryland Law Review. We express our thanks to Judge Guido Calabresi, not only for his
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of Accidents contributed to the emergence and maturing of the discipline known as law and economics? How have the perspectives of
scholars and judges in viewing tort law been affected by the famous
"Calabresian lens"?
This issue of the Maryland Law Review publishes the papers
presented at the Symposium, Calabresi'sThe Costs of Accidents: A Generation of Impact on Law and Scholarship. The papers, presented as portions of loosely related panels, were disparate ones. As Professor Anita
Bernstein remarked at the Symposium, "This book is a great signifier.
It's a book that you can hand to two dozen people and say, 'Tell me
what it says or what you think about it,' and get a huge variety of answers or insights." Yet major themes emerged during the Symposium
that cut across the various panels. In this Foreword, I consider some
of these major themes.
The first theme is that law and economics is a broadly defined
field of scholarly inquiry that encompasses many different perspectives; the differences among scholars in the field may be at least as
important as any shared common tenets. Professor Keith N. Hylton,
in his intellectual history of the development of law and economics,
divides the field using three sets of contrasting criteria: positive versus
normative, positivist versus anti-positivist, and belief in the strong
form of rationality contrasted with the weak form of rationality.4 He
finds Calabresi's contributions in The Costs of Accidents to be "clearly"
normative, 5 as contrasted with Posner's scholarship that "rejected the
reform efforts of Calabresi ...[and] defended the law as it is." 6 Hylton laments, however, the predominance of normative analysis in contemporary law and economics scholarship without greater efforts to
apply law and economics to understand the existing common law. He
also contrasts Calabresi's approach of weak rationality, in which actors
vigorous participation in the two-day Symposium, but also for his assistance in planning it.
We also want to express our appreciation to Dean Karen H. Rothenberg for her sponsorship and support of the Symposium; to Associate Dean Richard Boldt for the key role he
played in conceiving of the Symposium and making it a reality; and to Professor Emeritus
Oscar S. Gray for all his contributions. Richard Boldt, along with University of Maryland
School of Law Professors Richard A. Booth, David Hyman (now at the University of Illinois), Jana B. Singer, and Marley Weiss superbly moderated the panels at the Symposium.
LuAnn Marshall, Nancy Zibron, MaryJo Rodney, John Stylc, and Dave Fagan provided the
administrative support that made the Symposium run smoothly. Finally, the Symposium
was made possible by generous financial support from Morton P. Fisher, Jr.; Foundation
Press; The Pearl, Lawrence I., and Lloyd M. Gerber Memorial Lecture Fund; and Richard
J. Himelfarb.
4. Keith N. Hylton, Calabresiand the IntellectualHistory of Law and Economics, 64 MD. L.
REv. 85 (2005).
5. Id. at 91.
6. Id. at 90.
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generally act in rational ways, but with consistent deviations, with the
strong rationality version of Judge Richard A. Posner and others identified with the Chicago School.
The differences between the law and economics of Posner and of
Calabresi are evident in each of their own articles. Shortly after the
publication of The Costs of Accidents, the book was reviewed critically by
Posner, another of the founders of the law and economics movement. 7 As the opening speaker for the Symposium, Posner acknowl-

edged that by creating "an analytical framework that others could use
to formulate and advocate practical legal improvements," The Costs of
'
Accidents made "a classic contribution to legal thought," but he indi9
cated that he was "inclined to stand by [his earlier] criticisms." Posner defends the fault system and claims that the limited research
available supports his view that the existing system yields a variety of
benefits, including deterring harmful conduct, decentralizing the
goal of preventing accidents, and minimizing the bureaucratic administration of accident prevention. In response, Calabresi concludes
that although using economic analysis to criticize, explain, and justify
existing legal rules is appropriate, the discipline of law and the discipline of economics, as they interact with each other, are also capable
of creating a synergistic cycle of refinement and reform.'
Adam Benforado and Professor Jon Hanson analyze Calabresi's
and Posner's very different views of law and economics using concepts
borrowed from social psychology." They view Posner as representative of the "relative" dispositionist whose analysis proceeds from the
belief that "[t]he individual is presumed to be an independent,
choice-making agent whose acts both satisfy and reveal a set of underlying preferences." 12 In contrast, according to Benforado and Hanson, "Calabresi stands as a relative situationist in a particularly
3
dispositionist school of thought"; he "has the instincts of a social
1 4 and differs from those who would "ignore the more
psychologist,"
significant role played by situational forces-unseen or underappreciated features in our environment and in our interiors.""
7. Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 636 (1970).
8. Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi'sThe Costs of Accidents: A Reassessment, 64 MD.
L. REv. 12, 23 (2005).
9. Id. at 12.
10. Guido Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REv. 736 (2005).
11. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Costs of Dispositionism: The Premature Demise of
Situationist Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REv. 24 (2005).
12. Id. at 34.
13. Id. at 30.
14. Id. at 59.
15. Id. at 29.
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Benforado and Hanson suggest that both Calabresi's and Posner's intellectual development were influenced greatly by their differing reactions to changing intellectual trends emerging during the 1960s:
Calabresi seems to have embraced "the general push toward situationism," while Posner was one of a number of scholars that "lashed back
in an attempt to legitimate the systems that were being upended by
16
situationist thinking.

In her paper considering the disparate strands of law and economics theory, Professor Bernstein goes so far as to suggest that "law
and economics [has] lost its distinctive characteristics" that have
served as a "basis for dividing the legal academy into members and
nonmembers."' 7 According to Bernstein, many of the tenets once
held by law and economics, including "rational choice, utilitarianism,
efficiency, wealth maximization, markets, predictive power, and coherence have been questioned, abandoned, or smudged beyond recognition."' 8 The widespread acceptance of other notions often
previously identified with law and economics, such as "an explicit desire to make policy, an apparent taste for better-offness in a KaldorHicks sense, and an affinity for ex ante perspectives on the law" have
"triumphed" and have been so pervasively absorbed into legal thought
that they are no longer defining characteristics.' 9 Nothing may be left
of law and economics as a separate discipline, charges Bernstein,
other than "a faculty club."2"
The second theme that emerged throughout the Symposium was
the need for a greater commitment to empirical research to determine how legal rules and legal institutions affect the behavior of parties in the real world. Despite their considerable differences, both
Judge Posner and Judge Calabresi call for such research. Posner takes
issue with Calabresi's critical analysis of the traditional tort system because it was based on a priori reasoning, and "involved no inquiry into
the actual operation of the fault system."21 Calabresi, while standing
by his critique of the fault system, acknowledges that in The Costs of
Accidents he dismissed the fault system "immediately, and almost intuitively,"22 and that the issue of which accident compensation system
16.
17.
(2005).
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 65.
Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REv. 303, 332
Id. at 324.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 308.
Posner, supra note 8, at 18.
Calabresi, supra note 10, at 748.
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5

can best reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and accident preven23
tion is an empirical question.
While Calabresi and Posner both address the benefits of empiri"critcal research, Professor Robert L. Rabin laments what he calls the
ical intellectual vacuum .

.

. in the empirical realm" that remains a

24 Rabin
generation after the publication of The Costs of Accidents.
signifisurveys the failure of both legislatures and courts to advance
plans that
cantly "the renaissance" of experimentation with accident
This failpublication.
book's
Calabresi anticipated at the time of the
has reRabin,
to
ure to adopt innovative alternative plans, according
in
sulted from concerns about horizontal equity that are inherent
for speciallegislatively carving out a narrow subcategory of injuries
realities of
pragmatic
the
from
ized treatment within a no-fault system,
venture
to
courts
legislative politics, and from the unwillingness of
competence
into areas where they perceive that they lack institutional
compared with the legislative branch.
While acknowledging the need for greater empirical study, Judge
Calabresi also defends the continued use of theoretical model-build25
identiing in his concluding article. He suggests that model-making
whether
becomes
question
the
then
fies what "boxes" might exist, and
real
these theoretically derived boxes are "full" or "empty" in the
is
world. The advantage of model-making, according to Calabresi,
his
that the model may cause the scholar to look for something that
the
canonical viewpoint would otherwise cause him to miss. In one of
reMichelman
I.
Frank
highlights of this Symposium issue, Professor
Calaopens a debate-dormant for more than thirty years-between
in
bresi and himself on the topic of liability and property rules and, 2 6
doing so, illustrates the benefits of model-building in legal analysis.
In his original review of The Costs of Accidents, Michelman, as a scholar
of property law, applied concepts from7 the book to create a right/
2
entiremedy typology for private nuisance. By separating "liability"
tlements from "property" entitlements, he identified three possible
outcomes of a plaintiff's action seeking relief from a private nuisance
caused by a polluter: dismissal of the plaintiffs action, an injunction,
inand damages without injunctive relief (which Michelman, in the
stant article, clarifies to be "pay-as-you-go"-or temporary-dam23. Id. at 749.
64 MD. L. REV. 699,
24. Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law PlansRevisited,
733 (2005).
25. Calabresi, supra note 10, at 752-53.
REV. 136 (2005).
26. Frank I. Michelman, "There Have to Be Fou9', 64 MD. L.
Perspective on Calabresi's
Non-Accidental
A
Tort:
a
as
Pollution
Michelman,
I.
27. Frank
review).
(book
Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647 (1971)
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ages2 8 ). Subsequent to Michelman's original review, in the famous
Cathedralarticle, Calabresi and Douglas Melamed identified a
fourth
possibility: the possibility of a purchased injunction 2 9
(which
Michelman here re-categorizes as a "compensated restrictive real
covenant""°). In his article in this issue, Michelman identifies two
additional remedial outcomes. First, the compensated restrictive
real
covenant-previously recognized only as a single possibility-can
be
subdivided into either compensated restrictive real covenants
specifically enforceable or compensated restrictive real covenants enforceable
only by damagesfor breach.3" Second, the plaintiff's remedy for
damages, again recognized in the past as a single option, in fact consists
of
two separate remedial outcomes: (1) "pay-as-you-go" (temporary
damages), and (2) permanent damages (Michelman describes the latter
as
a "lump-sum" compensated easement).32 Michelman now claims
that,
just as Calabresi and Melamed had raised the bid to four in their
1972
article, he has now upped the bid to six remedial entitlements.
The
significance of this is that Michelman recognizes the limitations
of the
Hohfeldian "duple analysis"3 3 that had structured the dialogue
in the
past between Calabresi and Melamed, on one hand, and Michelman
himself, on the other hand. The criterion of remedial outcome
joins
the criteria of the liability decision (which looks backward) and
the
entitlement decision (which looks forward) to generate the additional
possible outcomes. Michelman's analysis thus exposes the profound
difference between Hohfeldian analysis and the analysis of Calabresi
and Melamed: "From The Cathedralwe view law, not in its aspect
of a
field of struggle for life, but rather in its aspect of a forum of
publicminded, policy-analytic intelligence."3 4 In this statement, Michelman
captures the essential difference between the tort law of generations
prior to The Costs of Accidents and tort law as conceptualized by
Calabresi and many others in our own time.
A third major theme of the Symposium, illustrated by a number
of panelists, was that something is lost if tort law, and the law
more
generally, are viewed solely-or even predominantly-through
an instrumental lens. Professor Jules Coleman's article clearly articulates
28. Michelman, supra note 26, at 155 tbl.F.
29. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
30. Michelman, supra note 26, at 147 tbl.C.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 155 tbl.F.
33. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning,23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
34. Michelman, supra note 26, at 157 (footnote omitted).
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to
the differences between a predominantly instrumental approach
perspective.
tort law, such as Calabresi's, and a corrective justice
as
Coleman sees the conceptual argument of The Costs of Accidents
unmoving tort law analysis away from addressing an "accident"-an
into
instead
it
fortunate event between two parties-and transforming
What is
an analysis of "accidents"-a social and economic problem.
lost when tort law becomes a technology to solve a social problem,
which
according to Coleman, is "the rich moral character of tort law,"
anone
to
agency
"is a way of expressing the nature of responsible
Profesof
other in our legal practices."" In a similar vein, the article
the
sors John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky defends
redress
common-law tort system and its focus on obligation 3and
7 Goldberg
others.
and
against the instrumental critiques of Calabresi
goals
and Zipursky argue that the common law fulfills a number of
other than the reduction of the costs of accidents, including elaboratthe
ing and enforcing norms of conduct and dispersing power within
The
accountability.
demand
political system to enable individuals to
and Reform
set of articles from the panel on The Costs of Accidents
3 8 who, in a 1980
concludes with the article of Justice Izhak Englard,
article, criticized the publication of The Costs of Accidents for ignoring
correcwhat he called the complex psychological factors supporting
retaliaand
tive justice goals of the tort system, including retribution
the
that
tion.3 o In his article in this Symposium issue, Englard argues
which
"legal Cathedral" remains an inherently pluralistic one, in
of
goals
consider
simultaneously
judges in a single mental process
4"
allocation.
and
compensation and retribution, as well as distribution
This pluralism of aims and methods in the judicial process, concludes
Englard, is a "reality, like human life."'"
Similarly, the three articles presented as a part of the panel on
Justice and the Role of Economic Theory consider how economic-based
Professor
standards may inadequately serve the interests of justice.
pricethe
between
conflict"
Gregory C. Keating considers the "tragic
some
that
lessness of human life and the necessity of acknowledging
64 MD. L. REv. 337 (2005).
35. Jules Coleman, The Costs of The Costs of Accidents,
36. Id. at 353.
of the Great Society, 64 MD. L.
37. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents
REV. 364 (2005).
from the Cathedral,64 MD. L.
38. Izhak Englard, The Costs of Accidents: A Retrospect View
RaV. 355 (2005).
American Tort Theory,
39. Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A CriticalAppraisalof Modern
(1980).
33-36
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27,
40. Englard, supra note 38, at 361.
41. Id.
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accidents are not worth preventing. 42 He concludes that although
such trade-offs are inevitable, they need not be made on the
basis of
market-based or cost-benefit criteria, but can be based on other
standards. As he notes, regulatory approaches often use an alternative
criterion such as reducing risks to the extent feasible or to
the point
where the activity is deemed "safe." Ultimately, Keating
concludes
that we may be expecting too much of "fair norms of accident law." 43
Regardless of the standard that society chooses to determine
the
tradeoffs between the costs of accidents and the costs of accident
prevention, the accident compensation system still must operate
against
society's "allocation of basic rights and [a] distribution of
wealth, income, and property"4 4 that constitutes "backgroundjustice.""
Professor Ugo Mattei argues that the early Calabresian version of
law and
economics, aided by the political agenda of Reagan-Thatcher
economics and globalization, established "hegemony" of American
legal
scholarship worldwide. 46 The later adoption by the law and
economics movement of an extreme ideology of individualization
and property rights, argues Mattei, has led to a decline of the worldwide
impact
of law and economics scholarship specifically and American
legal
scholarship more generally. Mattei asserts, "When an approach
to the
law loses its critical strengths and merely legitimizes a status
quo, it
betrays the function that in Western law has always granted
prestige to
academic thinking: a strong independent check on the political
process."4 7 Hanoch Sheinman explores Calabresi's two goals of
accident
law, justice and cost reduction.4 ' He argues that both justice
and welfare are independently valuable goals of accident law and
challenges
the claim, attributed to Ronald Dworkin, that "welfare is not
a distinct,
intrinsically normative value, and in any event.., its value depends
on
justice in a way that renders conflicts [between the two
goals]
impossible."4 9
In his paper, Judge Calabresi notes that one of the contributions
of The Costs of Accidents was to "bring back" deterrence as a goal
of tort
42. Gregory C. Keating, Pricelessnessand Life: An Essay for
Guido Calabresi,64 MD. L. REv.
159, 159 (2005).
43. Id. at 217.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 216 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS:
A RESTATEMENT §§ 14-15, at

50-55 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)).
46. Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An
64 MD. L. REv. 220 (2005).
47. Id. at 248.

48. Hanoch Sheinman, Are

Essay forJudge Guido Calabresi,

Tradeoffs Between Justice and Welfare Possible? Calabresi
and
Dworkin on the Normative Foundations of Law and Economics,
64 MD. L. REv. 250 (2005).
49. Id at 285.
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from
law, but to look at it from a structural point of view rather than
50 A number of papers presented in this
an individual point of view.
to analyze
issue use the analytical framework of The Costs of Accidents
In their
the deterrent function of tort law in a variety of contexts.
alterthe
consider
Fon
Vincy
article, Professors Francesco Parisi and
parthe
of
basis
the
native of distributing the costs of an accident on
other
of
ties' relative causal contributions, either in the absence
5 1 Parisi and
liability rules or in conjunction with negligence rules.
with negFon conclude that causal contribution rules, in conjunction
activities
their
ligence rules, may induce both parties to moderate
claim is proleading to harm, a combination of incentives that they
duced by no existing liability regime.
on puProfessor Michael L. Rustad begins the Symposium panel
decisions
Court
Supreme
of
nitive damages by arguing that a series
the wellsince 1991, eagerly pursued by corporate America, "threatens
two centuestablished functions of punitive damages developed over
ries of Anglo-American jurisprudence.

52

He argues that by focusing

justice," the Susolely on the "microanalysis of individual retributive
preme Court misses the opportunity to examine "the macrosociologisuggested by
cal functions of punitive damages" such as those
from a strucCalabresi's argument that deterrence should be viewed 5 3
Professor
tural-rather than from an individual-perspective.
of
AnthonyJ. Sebok argues that even if we accept the characterization
v. City of
at least some punitive damages by Judge Calabresi in Ciraolo
harm to
New York 5 4 as "socially compensatory" damages-reflecting
view
perhaps
victims other than the plaintiff before the court-or
that
system
a
them in other cases as a penalty functioning as a part of
to fines, these
Calabresi would refer to as specific deterrence, similar
the Due Proby
imposed
damages still are subject to the constraints
55 Judge Calabresi's notion that deterrence should be
cess Clause.
of view of an
seen as a structural goal, and not just from the point
Catherine M.
individual wrongdoer, is also reflected in Professor
prohibiSharkey's paper analyzing the historically frequent blanket
50. Calabresi, supra note 10, at 744.
The CompensationPrinciple
51. Francesco Parisi & Vincy Fon, Causation and Responsibility:
(2005).
from Grotius to Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REv. 108
by the Court That Would Be King
52. Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: FederalismDerailed
(2005).
540
461,
REv.
L.
MD.
64
Damages,
of Punitive
53. Id. at 518.
54. 216 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2000).
After Campbell, 64 MD.
55. AnthonyJ. Sebok, Deterrence orDisgorgement? ReadingCiraolo
L. REv. 541 (2005).
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tion against insurance for punitive damages. 6 Sharkey argues that
the expanded role of punitive damages in recent decades, including
serving as socially compensatory damages, is another way in which
the
legal system attempts to compensate harms and penalize injurers
on a
societal scale. Once these new roles of punitive damages are
understood, argues Sharkey, blanket prohibitions against the insurability
of
punitive damages are no longer justifiable and should be replaced
by
a test based upon whether the conduct causing the harm was
intentional or accidental.
Professor Kenneth S. Abraham's article explores the critical
role
of liability insurance in achieving deterrence from a structural
point
of view.5 7 He traces the relationship between insurance and accident
prevention from the mid-nineteenth century to the current
time.
Abraham chronicles how liability insurance initially was regarded
as
legitimate because it provided a source of available funds to compensate the injured victim. By the mid-twentieth century, however,
academic commentators and courts alike recognized a second
function
of liability insurance: loss spreading. According to Abraham,
Calabresi was among the first to analyze how the setting of insurance
premiums contributed to accident prevention. Abraham argues
that in
the arena of mass products, liability insurance premiums are likely
to
be more proportional to the degree of risk than in other, more
sporadic, accident contexts, and, therefore, the argument that liability
insurance premiums will mitigate accident prevention incentives
is
weaker in the mass products context. My own paper uses an
analysis
suggested by The Costs of Accidents to question whether liability
damage
judgments achieve their deterrence goals, either from a structural
perspective or from the perspective of an individual defendant,
in the
specific context of the manufacture and distribution of mass products,
such as cigarettes, asbestos products, and lead pigment, that are
fungible, or nearly so, and cause latent diseases decades after
their
production. 8
Judge Guido Calabresi has the last word in this Symposium issue.
In his introduction of Calabresi, Professor Oscar S. Gray remembers
their common teacher, Professor Fleming James, Jr., whose teaching
focused on how society manages the costs of accidents. 59 Judge
Cala56. Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs
of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV.
409 (2005).
57. Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability Insurance and Accident Prevention:
The Evolution of an
Idea, 64 MD. L. REv. 573 (2005).
58. Donald G. Gifford, The PeculiarChallengesPosed by Latent
DiseasesResultingfrom Mass
Products, 64 MD. L. REv. 613 (2005).
59. Oscar S. Gray, Introduction of Guido Calabresi, 64 MD. L.
REv. 734 (2005).
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on The Costs of
bresi then reflects back as a mature judge and scholar
6" He acknowledges
Accidents, which he describes as "a young book."
raised by
several weaknesses in the book, including some of the issues
other papers in this Symposium issue. For example, he acknowledges
6' and that
that his treatment of the role of justice was inadequate,
values" as a
there was no discussion of "shaping tastes" or "formulating
was
Accidents
of
2
goal of law.6 Calabresi notes, however, that The Costs
law-loss
the first attempt to analyze the multiple functions of tort
of
degree
optimal
the
achieving
minimization, distributional equity,
to
relation
costs-in
loss spreading, and minimizing administrative
63
each other.
Calabresi acknowledges that the fault system as it operates today,
the genwith comparative responsibility, is a very different system than
of Accidents.
erally all-or-nothing regime that he criticized in The Costs
between
link
a
of
law
tort
within
vitality
He asserts that the continuing
do with
to
less
have
may
a particular victim and a particular injurer
than
Zipursky,
and
the values described by Coleman, and Goldberg
mainto
been able
with the political power of trial lawyers who "have "64
advantage.
distributional
their
to
tain [the system]
thinking
Calabresi also hints at the future direction of his own
fault to our
about accident law: "the relationship of accident law and
entreprethat
suggests
He
generalized system of free enterprise."65
liability
strict
a
neurs function in a free market system that parallels
Calafails,
system, not a fault-based environment. When a business
of the consebresi notes, society does not relieve the entrepreneur
of her
benefits
and
costs
the
quences even if her initial analysis of
products or services was reasonable.
good
Calabresi concludes that The Costs of Accidents was a "pretty
6 6 that attempted to use what we know as lawyers and institutionbook"
this more
alists to push forward economic theory and then to apply
It is my hope
sophisticated economic theory to the law of accidents.
A Generthat this Symposium issue, Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents:
formoves
way,
small
some
ation of Impact on Law and Scholarship, in
expounded
ideas
ward the dialectic described by Calabresi about the
in his "pretty good book."
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Calabresi, supra note 10, at 738.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 742-43.
Id. at 751.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 738.

